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Abstract—Recent work in multicast routing for wireless mesh
networks has focused on metrics that estimate link quality
to maximize throughput. Nodes must collaborate in order to
compute the path metric and forward data. The assumption
that all nodes are honest and behave correctly during metric
computation, propagation, and aggregation, as well as during
data forwarding, leads to unexpected consequences in adversarial
networks where compromised nodes act maliciously.
In this work we identify novel attacks against high-throughput
multicast protocols in wireless mesh networks. The attacks exploit
the local estimation and global aggregation of the metric to
allow attackers to attract a large amount of traffic. We show
that these attacks are very effective against multicast protocols
based on high-throughput metrics. We conclude that aggressive
path selection is a double-edged sword: While it maximizes
throughput, it also increases attack effectiveness in the absence
of defense mechanisms. Our approach to defend against the
identified attacks combines measurement-based detection and
accusation-based reaction techniques. The solution also accommodates transient network variations and is resilient against
attempts to exploit the defense mechanism itself. A detailed
security analysis of our defense scheme establishes bounds on
the impact of attacks. We demonstrate both the attacks and our
defense using ODMRP, a representative multicast protocol for
wireless mesh networks, and SPP, an adaptation of the wellknown ETX unicast metric to the multicast setting.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) emerged as a promising
technology that offers low-cost high-bandwidth community
wireless services. A WMN consists of a set of stationary
wireless routers that form a multi-hop backbone, and a set
of mobile clients that communicate via the wireless backbone. Numerous applications envisioned to be deployed in
WMNs, such as webcast, distance learning, online games,
video conferencing, and multimedia broadcasting, follow a
pattern where one or more sources disseminate data to a group
of changing receivers. These applications can benefit from the
service provided by multicast routing protocols.
Multicast routing protocols deliver data from a source to
multiple destinations organized in a multicast group. In the last
few years, several protocols [2]–[8] were proposed to provide
multicast services for multi-hop wireless networks. Initially,
these protocols were proposed for mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs), focusing primarily on network connectivity and
using the number of hops (or hop count) between the source
∗ A preliminary version of this paper appears in the Proceedings of SECON
2008 [1]. This is the full version of the paper.

and receivers as the route selection metric. However, many
of the applications that benefit from multicast services also
have high-throughput requirements, and hop count does not
maximize throughput [9], [10] as it does not take into account
link quality. Given the stationary nature and increased capabilities of nodes in mesh networks, recent protocols [11], [12]
focus on maximizing path throughput by selecting paths based
on metrics that capture the quality of the wireless links [10],
[13]–[16]. We refer to such metrics as link-quality metrics or
high-throughput metrics, and to protocols using such metrics
as high-throughput protocols.
In a typical high-throughput multicast protocol, nodes periodically send probes to their neighbors to measure the quality
of the links from their neighbors. During route discovery,
a node estimates the cost of the path by combining its
own measured metric of adjacent links with the route cost
accumulated on the route discovery packet. The path with the
best metric is then selected. High-throughput metrics protocols
require the nodes to collaborate in order to derive the path
metric, thus relying on the assumption that nodes are collaborative and behave correctly during metric computation and
propagation. However, this assumption is difficult to guarantee
in wireless networks that are vulnerable to attacks coming
from both insiders and outsiders, due to the open and shared
nature of the medium and the multi-hop characteristic of the
communication. An aggressive path selection introduces new
vulnerabilities and provides the attacker with an increased
arsenal of attacks leading to unexpected consequences. For
example, adversaries may manipulate the metrics in order
to be selected on more paths and to draw more traffic,
creating opportunities for attacks such as data dropping, mesh
partitioning, or traffic analysis.
Previous work showed vulnerabilities of unicast routing protocols that use hop count as a metric. Several unicast routing
protocols were proposed to cope with outsider [17]–[20] or
insider attacks [19], [21]–[24]. Secure wireless multicast was
less studied [25], [26] and focused primarily on tree-based
protocols using hop count as a path selection metric.
In this work, we study the security implications of using
high-throughput metrics. We focus on multicast in a wireless
mesh network environment because it is a representative
environment in which high-throughput metrics will be beneficial. Although the attacks we identify can also be conducted
in unicast, the multicast setting makes them more effective
and, at the same time, more difficult to defend against. We
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focus on mesh-based multicast protocols as they have the
potential to be more resilient to attacks. We use ODMRP [6]
as a representative protocol for wireless mesh networks and
SPP [11], a metric based on the well-known ETX [10] unicast
metric, as a high-throughput multicast metric. We selected
SPP since it was shown to outperform all the other multicast
metrics for ODMRP [11]. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper to examine vulnerabilities of high-throughput
metrics in general, and in multicast protocols for wireless mesh
networks in particular. We summarize our contributions:
• We identify attacks against multicast protocols that exploit
the use of high-throughput metrics. The attacks consist of local
metric manipulation (LMM) and global metric manipulation
(GMM), and allow an attacker to attract significant traffic. We
show that aggressive path selection is a double-edged sword:
It leads to throughput maximization, but in the absence of
protection mechanisms it also increases attack effectiveness.
For example, in our simulations, the GMM attack requires
only about a quarter of the number of attackers needed by
a simple data dropping attack to create the same disruption
in the multicast service. Since a small number of attackers
can severely impede the protocol, an effective solution must
identify and isolate all malicious nodes.
• We identify a dangerous effect of the attacks, referred
to as metric poisoning, which causes many honest nodes to
have incorrect metrics. Consequently, any response mechanism
cannot rely on poisoned metrics for local recovery and must
either use a fallback procedure not relying on the metric or
refresh the metric before starting recovery.
• We propose a defense scheme that combines measurement
-based detection and accusation-based reaction techniques. To
accommodate transient network variations, we use temporary
accusations that have a duration proportional to the disruption
created by the accused node. To prevent attackers from exploiting the defense mechanism itself, we limit the number of
accusations that can be generated by a node.
• We perform a detailed security analysis of our defense
scheme and establish bounds on the impact of attacks. Extensive simulations with ODMRP and the SPP metric confirm
our analysis and show that our strategy is very effective in
defending against the attacks, while adding a low overhead.
II. H IGH -T HROUGHPUT M ESH -BASED M ULTICAST
ROUTING
We consider a multi-hop wireless network where nodes
participate in the data forwarding process for other nodes.
We assume a mesh-based multicast routing protocol, which
maintains a mesh connecting multicast sources and receivers.
Path selection is performed based on a metric designed to
maximize throughput. Below, we provide an overview of
high-throughput metrics for multicast, then describe in details
how such metrics are integrated with mesh-based multicast
protocols.
A. High-Throughput Metrics
Traditionally, routing protocols have used hop count as a
path selection metric. In static networks however, this metric

was shown to achieve sub-optimal throughput because paths
tend to include lossy wireless links [10], [27]. As a result,
in recent years the focus has shifted toward high-throughput
metrics that seek to maximize throughput by selecting paths
based on the quality of wireless links (e.g., ETX [10], PP [15],
[27], RTT [14]). In such metrics, the quality of the links
to/from a node’s neighbors is measured by periodic probing.
The metric for an entire path is obtained by aggregating the
metrics reported by the nodes on the path.
Several high-throughput metrics for multicast were proposed in [11]. All of these metrics are adaptations of unicast
metrics to the multicast setting by taking into account the
fundamental differences between unicast and multicast communication. Transmissions in multicast are less reliable than in
unicast for several reasons. In unicast, a packet is sent reliably
using link-layer unicast transmission, which involves linklayer acknowledgments and possibly packet retransmissions;
in multicast, a packet is sent unreliably using link-layer
broadcast, which does not involve link layer acknowledgments
or data retransmissions. Moreover, unicast transmissions are
preceded by a RTS/CTS exchange; in multicast there is no
RTS/CTS exchange, which increases collision probability and
decreases transmission reliability. Many metrics for unicast
routing minimize the medium access time, while metrics for
multicast capture in different ways the packet delivery ratio.
All the high-throughput multicast metrics proposed in [11]
showed improvement over the original path selection strategy. The SPP metric [11], an adaptation of the well-known
ETX [10] unicast metric, was shown to outperform the other
multicast metrics [11], [28]. Thus, in the remainder of the
paper and in our experimental evaluation, we consider SPP
for demonstrative purposes. Below, we first give an overview
of ETX, then show how it was extended to SPP.
ETX Metric. The ETX metric [10] was proposed for
unicast and estimates the expected number of transmissions
needed to successfully deliver a unicast packet over a link,
including retransmissions. Each node periodically broadcasts
probe packets which include the number of probe packets
received from each of its neighbors over a time interval. A pair
of neighboring nodes, A and B, estimate the quality of the link
1
A ↔ B by using the formula ETX = df ×d
, where df and dr
r
are the probabilities that a packet is sent successfully from A
to B (forward direction) and from B to A (reverse direction),
respectively. The value of ETX for a path ofPk links between a
k
source S and a receiver R is ETXS→R = i=1 ETXi , where
ETXi is the ETX value of the i-th link on the path; ETXS→R
estimates the total number of transmissions by all nodes on
the path to deliver a packet from a source to a receiver.
SPP Metric. ETX was adapted to the multicast setting by
Roy et al. in the form of the SPP metric [11]. The value of
SPP for a path of k links between a source S and a receiver
R is SPPS→R = Πki=1 SPPi , where the metric for each link i
on the path is SPPi = df and df is defined as in ETX. The
rationale for defining SPP as above is twofold:
• Unlike in unicast, where a successful transmission over
a link depends on the quality of both directions of that
link, in multicast only the quality of the forward direction
matters because there are no link layer acknowledgments.
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The quality of a link A → B, as perceived by node B, is
SPPi = df and represents the probability that B receives a
packet successfully from A over the link A → B. Node B
obtains df by counting the probes received from A over a
fixed time interval.
• Also unlike unicast, in which the individual link metrics are
summed, in multicast they are multiplied. This reflects the
fact that for SPP the probability of a packet being delivered
over a path from a source to a receiver is the product of
the probabilities that the packet is successfully delivered to
each of the intermediate nodes on the path. If any of the
intermediate nodes fails to receive the packet, this causes
the transmission for the entire route to fail, since there are
no retransmissions. SPPS→R (in fact 1/SPPS→R ) estimates
the expected number of transmissions needed at the source
to successfully deliver a packet from a source to a receiver.
SPP takes values in the interval [0, 1], with higher metric
values being better. In particular, SPP = 1 denotes perfect
reliability, while SPP = 0 denotes complete unreliability.
B. High-Throughput Mesh-Based Multicast Routing
Multicast protocols provide communication from sources
to receivers organized in groups by establishing dissemination
structures such as trees or meshes, dynamically updated as
nodes join or leave the group. Tree-based multicast protocols
(e.g., MAODV [7]) build optimized data paths, but require
more complex operations to create and maintain the multicast
tree, and are less resilient to failures. Mesh-based multicast
protocols (e.g., ODMRP [6]) build more resilient data paths,
but have higher overhead due to redundant retransmissions.
We focus on ODMRP as a representative mesh-based multicast protocol for wireless networks. Below we first give an
overview of ODMRP, then describe how it can be enhanced
with any link-quality metric. The protocol extension to use a
high-throughput metric was first described by Roy et al. [11],
[28]. We refer to the ODMRP protocol using a high-throughput
metric as ODMRP-HT in order to distinguish it from the
original ODMRP [6] protocol.
ODMRP overview. ODMRP is an on-demand multicast
routing protocol for multi-hop wireless networks, which uses
a mesh of nodes for each multicast group. Nodes are added to
the mesh through a route selection and activation protocol.
The source periodically recreates the mesh by flooding a
J OIN Q UERY message in the network in order to refresh the
membership information and update the routes. We use the
term round to denote the interval between two consecutive
mesh creation events. J OIN Q UERY messages are flooded
using a basic flood suppression mechanism, in which nodes
only process the first received copy of a flooded message.
When a receiver node gets a J OIN Q UERY message, it
activates the path from itself to the source by constructing and
broadcasting a J OIN R EPLY message that contains entries for
each multicast group it wants to join; each entry has a next hop
field filled with the corresponding upstream node. When an
intermediate node receives a J OIN R EPLY message, it knows
whether it is on the path to the source or not, by checking if
the next hop field of any of the entries in the message matches

Fig. 1: An example of ODMRP-HT mesh creation for a multicast
group with 2 sources (S1 , S2 ) and 6 receivers (R1 , . . . , R6 ). The
label on each link represents the value of the link’s SPP metric.

its own identifier. If so, it makes itself a node part of the mesh
(the F ORWARDING G ROUP) and creates and broadcasts a new
J OIN R EPLY built upon the matched entries.
Once the J OIN R EPLY messages reach the source, the
multicast receivers become connected to the source through
a mesh of nodes (the F ORWARDING G ROUP) which ensures the delivery of multicast data. While a node is in
the F ORWARDING G ROUP, it rebroadcasts any non-duplicate
multicast data packets that it receives.
ODMRP takes a “soft state” approach in that nodes put a
minimal effort to maintain the mesh. To leave the multicast
group, receiver nodes are not required to explicitly send any
message, instead they do not reply to J OIN Q UERY messages.
Also, a node’s participation in the F ORWARDING G ROUP
expires if its forwarding-node status is not updated.
ODMRP-HT. We now describe ODMRP-HT, a protocol
that enhances ODMRP with high-throughput metrics. The
main differences between ODMRP-HT and ODMRP are: (1)
instead of selecting routes based on minimum delay (which
results in choosing the fastest routes), ODMRP-HT selects
routes based on a link-quality metric, and (2) ODMRPHT uses a weighted flood suppression mechanism to flood
J OIN Q UERY messages instead of a basic flood suppression.
As required by the link-quality metric, each node measures
the quality of the links from its neighbors to itself, based on
the periodic probes sent by its neighbors. The J OIN Q UERY
message is flooded periodically by a source S and contains a
route cost field which accumulates the metric for the route on
which the message travelled. Upon receiving a J OIN Q UERY, a
node updates the route cost field by accumulating the metric of
the last link travelled by the message. Because different paths
may have different metrics, J OIN Q UERY messages are flooded
using a weighted flood suppression mechanism, in which a
node processes flood duplicates for a fixed interval of time
and rebroadcasts flood messages that advertise a better metric
(indicated by the route cost field)1 . Each node also records the
node from which it received the J OIN Q UERY with the best
quality metric as its upstream node for the source S.
After waiting for a fixed interval of time, during which it
may receive several J OIN Q UERY packets that contain different
route metrics, a multicast receiver records as its upstream
for source S the neighbor that advertised the J OIN Q UERY
1 Several studies [26], [28] show that the overhead caused by rebroadcasting
some of the flood packets is reasonable, validating the effectiveness of this
weighted flood suppression strategy.

4

with the best metric. Just like in ODMRP, the receiver then
constructs a J OIN R EPLY packet, which will be forwarded
towards the source on the optimal path as defined by the
metric and will activate the nodes on this path as part
of the F ORWARDING G ROUP. In Fig. 1 we give an example of how ODMRP-HT selects the mesh of nodes in the
F ORWARDING G ROUP based on the SPP link-quality metric.
III. ATTACKS AGAINST H IGH -T HROUGHPUT M ULTICAST
We present several attacks against high-throughput multicast protocols. The attacks exploit vulnerabilities introduced
by the use of high-throughput metrics. They require little
resource from the attacker, but can cause severe damage to
the performance of the multicast protocol. We first present the
adversarial model, followed by the targets and the details of
the attacks.
A. Adversarial Model
Malicious nodes may exhibit Byzantine behavior, either
alone or in collusion with other malicious nodes. We refer
to any arbitrary action by authenticated nodes deviating from
protocol specification as Byzantine behavior, and to such an
adversary as a Byzantine adversary. Examples of Byzantine
behavior include: Dropping, injecting, modifying, replaying,
or rushing packets, and creating wormholes.
This work considers attacks that target the network level
and assumes that adversaries do not have control on lower
layers such as the physical or MAC layers. We assume
the physical layer uses jamming-resilient techniques such as
direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) or frequency hopping
spread spectrum (FHSS) (as in the case of 802.11). We do
not consider the Sybil attack, which can be addressed using
techniques such as [29], [30], complementary to our routing
protocol. Also, preventing traffic analysis is not the goal of
this work.
B. Attack Goals
We focus on attacks that aim to disrupt the multicast data
delivery. The two main attack targets that allow the attacker
to achieve this goal are the path establishment and data
forwarding phases of the protocol.
Path establishment attacks prevent receivers from connecting to multicast sources. In ODMRP-HT, since each receiver
only activates a single path to each source, an attacker lying
on that path can prevent path establishment by dropping
the J OIN R EPLY message. Data forwarding attacks disrupt
the routing service by dropping data packets. In both cases,
the attack effectiveness is directly related to the attackers’
ability to control route selection and to be selected on routes.
Traditionally, such ability can be achieved via wireless-specific
attacks such as rushing and wormholes. The use of highthroughput metrics gives attackers additional opportunities to
be included in the mesh by manipulating the routing metric.
Rushing and wormholes are general attacks against wireless
routing protocols that have been studied extensively [31]–
[34]. Thus, below we focus on metric manipulation attacks,
which require only little effort to execute, yet are extremely
detrimental to the protocol performance.

Fig. 2: Metric manipulation attack during the propagation of the flood
packet from the source S to receiver R. A label above a link is the
link’s real SPP metric; a label below a link is the link’s metric falsely
claimed by a node executing a LMM attack; a label below a node is
the accumulated route metric advertised by the node.

C. Metric Manipulation Attacks
As discussed in Section II, multicast protocols using highthroughput metrics prefer paths to the source that are perceived
as having high-quality, while trying to avoid low-quality paths.
Thus, a good strategy for an attacker to increase its chances
of being selected in the F ORWARDING G ROUP is to advertise
artificially good metrics for routes to the source.
The use of high-throughput metrics requires each node to
collect local information about its adjacent links based on
periodic probes from its neighbors. This local information is
accumulated in J OIN Q UERY packets and propagated in the
network, allowing nodes to obtain global information about
the quality of the routes from the source. Adversaries can
execute two types of metric manipulation attacks: local metric
manipulation (LMM) and global metric manipulation (GMM).
These attacks are Byzantine in nature, as they are conducted
by nodes that have the credentials to participate in the routing
protocol, but are under adversarial control.
Local Metric Manipulation (LMM) Attacks. An adversarial node artificially increases the quality of its adjacent links,
distorting the neighbors’ perception about these links. The
falsely advertised “high-quality” links will be preferred and
malicious nodes have better chances to be included on routes.
A node can claim a false value for the quality of the links
towards itself. In Fig. 2 a malicious node C1 claims that
SPPB1 →C1 = 0.9 instead of the correct metric of 0.6. Thus,
C1 accumulates a false local metric for the link B1 → C1
and advertises to R the metric SPPS→C1 = 0.9 instead of
the correct metric SPPS→C1 = 0.6. The route S-A1 -B1 -C1 -R
will be chosen over the correct route S-A3 -B3 -C3 -R.
Global Metric Manipulation (GMM) Attacks. In a GMM
attack, a malicious node arbitrarily changes the value of
the route metric accumulated in the flood packet, before
rebroadcasting this packet. A GMM attack allows a node to
manipulate not only its own contribution to the path metric, but
also the contributions of previous nodes that were accumulated
in the path metric. For example, in Fig. 2 attacker C2 should
advertise a route metric of 0.25, but instead advertises a route
metric of 0.9 to node R. This causes the route S-A2 -B2 -C2 -R
to be selected over the correct route S-A3 -B3 -C3 -R.

D. Impact of Metric Manipulation Attacks on Routing
The attacks we described allow attackers to attract and
control traffic. In addition, the epidemic nature of metric
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B. S-ODMRP Overview

(a) benign case

(b) attack case

Fig. 3: Metric manipulation attack in a network with one source (S),
two receivers (R1 , R2 ) and one attacker (A). The label on each link
represents the value of the link’s SPP metric.

derivation causes an epidemic attack propagation, which “poisons” the metrics of many nodes in the network. We exemplify
both of these effects with the scenario in Fig. 3.
When no attackers are present (Fig. 3(a)), nodes B, C and
D are activated as part of the F ORWARDING G ROUP. Consider
that node A executes a metric manipulation attack (Fig. 3(b)):
Upon receiving the J OIN Q UERY, node A changes the metric
and advertises a perfect metric with value 1. Consequently,
both receivers R1 and R2 are “attracted” to it and only nodes
B and C will be selected as part of the F ORWARDING G ROUP.
The net effect is that both R1 and R2 are denied service since
they do not have a path to the source.
The false metric advertisement by node A also poisons the
metrics of many nodes in the network. For example, node C
derives an incorrect metric of 0.9, and then propagates it to
its neighbors, causing them to derive an incorrect metric as
well. Besides distorting path establishment for data delivery,
a severe side effect of the attack is that it introduces a
significant challenge for attack recovery. For example, even if
A’s neighbors are able to detect A is an attacker, they cannot
rely on the metric to find a new route to the source. Indeed, if
node C detects that A is malicious, it can try to activate nodes
F or B, which advertised the second best metric; however,
routes through either F or B lead back to the attacker. The
problem stems from the fact that the metric cannot be relied
upon and nodes do not know the right direction to “break free”
from the attraction of A. Hence, we make the observation that
defense mechanisms cannot rely on the existing metric for
recovery and have to either resort to a fallback procedure not
using the metric or refresh the metric before starting recovery.
IV. S ECURE H IGH -T HROUGHPUT M ULTICAST ROUTING
In this section, we present our secure multicast routing protocol (S-ODMRP) that accommodates high-throughput metrics.
A. Authentication Framework
We assume that each user authorized to be part of the mesh
network has a pair of public and private keys and a client
certificate that binds its public key to a unique user identifier.
This defends against external attacks from users that are not
part of the network. We assume source data is authenticated,
so that receivers can distinguish authentic data from spurious
data. Efficient source data authentication can be achieved with
existing schemes such as TESLA [35]. Finally, we assume the
existence of a secure neighbor discovery scheme [36].

Our approach relies on the observation that regardless of the
attack strategy, attackers do not affect the multicast protocol
unless they cause a drop in the packet delivery ratio (PDR). We
adopt a reactive approach in which attacker nodes are detected
through a measurement-based detection protocol component,
and then isolated through an accusation-based reaction protocol component. We next describe these two components.
Measurement-based attack detection. Whether by packet
dropping alone or by combining it with with metric manipulation to attract routes, the effect of an attack is that data is not
delivered at a rate consistent with the advertised path quality.
We propose a generic attack detection strategy that relies on
the ability of honest nodes to detect the discrepancy between
the expected PDR (ePDR) and the perceived PDR (pPDR). A
node can estimate the ePDR of a route from the value of the
metric for that route2 ; the node can determine the pPDR for a
route by measuring the rate at which it receives data packets
from its upstream on that route3 .
Both F ORWARDING G ROUP nodes and receiver nodes monitor the pPDR of their upstream node. If ePDR − pPDR for a
route becomes larger than a detection threshold δ, then nodes
suspect that the route is under attack because the route failed
to deliver data at a rate consistent with its claimed quality4 .
Accusation-based attack reaction. We use a controlledaccusation mechanism in which a node, on detecting malicious
behavior, temporarily accuses the suspected node by flooding
in the network an ACCUSATION message containing its own
identity (the accuser node) and the identity of the accused
node, as well as the duration of the accusation. As long as
the accusation is valid, metrics advertised by an accused node
will be ignored and the node will not be selected as part of the
F ORWARDING G ROUP. This strategy also successfully handles
attacks against path establishment. From the downstream node
point of view, the dropping of a J OIN R EPLY message causes
exactly the same effect as the attacker dropping all data
packets, thus the downstream nodes will react and accuse the
attacker.
To prevent the abuse of the accusation mechanism by attackers, a node is not allowed to issue a new accusation before
its previously issued accusation expires. Accused nodes can
still act as receivers even though they are excluded from the
F ORWARDING G ROUP. We use a temporary accusation strategy to cope with transient network variations: The accusation
duration is calculated proportional to the observed discrepancy
between ePDR and pPDR, so that accusations caused by
metric inflation and malicious data dropping last longer, while
accusations caused by transient network variations last shorter.
Finally, to address the metric poisoning effect caused by
metric manipulation attacks, the metric in the entire network
is refreshed shortly after attack detection. In S-ODMRP,
2 For

the SPP metric, a route’s ePDR is equal to the route’s metric.
data authentication allows nodes to distinguish authentic packets
from spurious ones and only authentic packets are counted towards pPDR.
4 Note that the rate inconsistency may also be caused by natural link quality
variations. We do not differentiate between losses caused by adversarial
behavior and natural link variations because lossy links must also be avoided
in order to maintain a good performance level.
3 Source
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Sign(m): sign message m using this node’s private key
Verify(n id, sig): verify the signature sig using node n id’s public key
and exit the procedure if the verification fails
Start timer(timer, t): start timer timer with timeout t
Refresh timer(timer, t): if timer is not active, then call
Start timer(timer, t); otherwise, set timeout of timer to t
Broadcast(m): broadcast message m one hop
Flood(m): flood message m in the entire network
Send message(m, n id): reliably send message m to neighbor n id
Link metric(n id): return the measured link metric to neighbor n id
Get best metric(query set): return the best metric of all queries in the
set query set, regardless of accusation status
Get neighbor best metric(query set): return the neighbor that has the
best metric in the set query set, regardless of accusation status

Fig. 4: Basic procedures used in the S-ODMRP protocol description

the metric refreshment is achieved automatically through the
periodic J OIN Q UERY messages.
C. S-ODMRP Detailed Description
To describe S-ODMRP in detail, we use the list of procedures described in Fig. 4. For simplicity, we limit the
description to one multicast group and one multicast source.
However, the scheme can easily be extended to multicast
groups with multiple sources.
1) Mesh Creation: S-ODMRP mesh creation follows the
same pattern of ODMRP-HT presented in Sec. II-B. As
described in Fig. 5, the source node S periodically broadcasts
to the entire network a J OIN Q UERY message in order to
refresh the membership information and to update the routes
(lines 1-5). The J OIN Q UERY message is signed by S and is
propagated using a weighted flood suppression mechanism.
Nodes only process J OIN Q UERY messages that have valid
signatures (line 8) and that are received from nodes not currently accused (indicated by an ACCUSATION L IST maintained
by each node) (lines 18-19). Nodes record the upstream node
and the metric corresponding to the route with the best metric
as best upstream and best metric (line 23).
The J OIN R EPLY messages are then sent from receivers back to S along optimal paths as defined by
the high-throughput metric, leading to the creation of the
F ORWARDING G ROUP (the multicast mesh) (lines 28-33).
After sending a J OIN R EPLY to its best upstream, a node
starts to monitor the PDR from its best upstream in order
to measure its perceived PDR (pPDR) (line 38).
To address attackers that strategically accuse certain nodes
in order to disconnect the network, we make one exception
from the rule that only non-accused nodes are included in
the F ORWARDING G ROUP: If the best metric is advertised
by an accused neighbor, a node also activates this neighbor
(by sending a J OIN R EPLY) in addition to the best nonaccused neighbor (line 39-41). This ensures that good paths
are still utilized, even if honest nodes on these paths are falsely
accused. In Sec. VI-E, we show that this strategy only adds a
very low overhead.
2) Attack Detection: As described in the protocol overview,
we detect attacks using a measurement-based mechanism,
where each F ORWARDING G ROUP and receiver node continuously monitors the discrepancy between ePDR and pPDR and
flags an attack if ePDR − pPDR > δ.

Executed at the source node to initiate a new J OIN Q UERY message:
1: create a J OIN Q UERY message q
2: q.source = source id; q.from = source id
3: q.metric = 0; q.seq = join seq
4: join seq + +
5: Sign(q); Broadcast(q)
Executed at a node upon receipt of a J OIN Q UERY message q:
6: if (latest received join seq > q.seq) then
7:
return // ignore old queries
8: Verify(q.from, q.sig)
9: get new query = FALSE
10: if (latest received join seq < q.seq) then
11:
// get a new (non-duplicate) query
12:
latest received join seq = q.seq
13:
best metric = 0
14:
best upstream = INVALID NODE
15:
fastest upstream = q.from // for fallback recovery
16:
get new query = TRUE
17: received queries.insert(q) // store the query
18: if (accusation list.contains accused node(q.from)) then
19:
q.metric = 0
20: else
21:
q.metric = q.metric × Link metric(q.from)
22: if (get new query OR q.metric > best metric) then
23:
best upstream = q.from; best metric = q.metric;
24:
q.from = node id
25:
Sign(q); Broadcast(q)
26: if (get new query AND is receiver) then
27:
Start timer(reply timer, REPLY TIMEOUT)
Executed at a node upon timeout of reply timer:
28: Send reply()
Executed at a node upon receipt of a J OIN R EPLY message r:
29: if (latest received reply seq < r.seq) then
30:
latest received reply seq = r.seq
31:
Refresh timer(FG timer, FG TIMEOUT)
32:
if (not is receiver) then
33:
Send reply()
Send reply()
34: create a J OIN R EPLY message r
35: r.seq = latest received join seq
36: Send message(r, best upstream)
37: if (best metric > 0) then
38:
start monitoring the PDR of best upstream
39: if (Get best metric(received queries) > best metric) then
40:
// Activate the accused neighbor with best metric
41:
Send message(r, Get neighbor best metric(received queries))
42: received queries.clear() // purge stored queries

Fig. 5: Mesh creation algorithm

The most straightforward method for estimating pPDR is
to use a sliding window method, with pPDR calculated as
pPDR = r/w, where r is the number of packets received in
the window and w is the number of packets sent by the source
(derived from packet sequence numbers) in the window. Albeit
being simple, this method is sensitive to bursty packet loss. In
addition, this approach requires a node to wait until at least
w packets are sent in a round before being able to make any
decision. Therefore, setting w too large causes delay in making
decisions, whereas setting w too small results in inaccurate
pPDR estimation and hence more frequent false positives. In
general, it is difficult to determine the optimal value for w, as it
depends on the network conditions and the specific position of
a node. To avoid these shortcomings, we propose an efficient
statistical-based estimation method for pPDR that naturally
adapts to the network environment of each node.
The main idea is to use the Wilson estimate [37] to
determine a confidence interval for pPDR, instead of trying
to obtain a single estimated value. Let m be the number of
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packets received by a node and n be the number of packets
sent by the source in the same time period, which can be
derived from packet sequence numbers. The Wilson estimate
requires that n ≥ 5 [37], so whenever n ≥ 5, we can obtain a
confidence interval for pPDR as (p̂ − e, p̂ + e), where
r
p̂(1 − p̂)
m+2
and e = z
.
p̂ =
n+4
n+4
We assign z = 1.96 to obtain the commonly used confidence
level of 95%. An attack is detected if the upper bound of the
confidence interval for pPDR is less than the estimated PDR
even after accounting for normal network variations, i.e., if:
p̂ + e < ePDR − δ,
where δ is the estimated PDR discrepancy under normal
network conditions. In this method, the exact number of
packets required for attack detection naturally adapts to the
path quality and the severity of the attack. In addition, there is
a precise level of confidence on the accuracy of our estimation.
This method has the advantage that it applies for both constant
rate and variable rate data sources.
Addressing Silent Periods. If a node fails to receive
any data packets in a round, the above method will be not
able to compute the confidence interval of pPDR for its
upstream node, since the value of n is derived from sequence
numbers contained in received packets. We address this issue
by including the current data sequence number in J OIN Q UERY
packets, which are periodically flooded in the network. Thus,
unless a node does not have any adversarial-free path to the
source, it can always obtain the current data sequence number
and compute the pPDR confidence interval to detect attacks.
3) Attack Reaction: To isolate attackers, our protocol uses
a controlled-accusation mechanism which consists of three
components, staggered reaction timeout, accusation message
propagation and handling, and recovery message propagation
and handling.
As described in Fig. 6, when a node detects attack behavior,
it starts a React Timer with timeout value β(1−ePDR), where
β is a system parameter that determines the maximum timeout
for reaction timer (line 1). Since ePDR decreases monotonically along a multicast data path, nodes farther away from the
source will have a larger timeout value for the React Timer.
This staggered timeout technique ensures nodes immediately
below the attacker will take action first, before any of their
downstream nodes mistakenly accuse their upstream node.
When the React Timer of a node N expires, N accuses
its best upstream node and cancels the React Timer at its
downstream nodes with the following actions:
• create, sign, and flood an ACCUSATION message in the
network, which contains N ’s identity (the accuser node)
and the identity of N ’s best upstream node (the accused
node). The message also contains a value accusation time =
α(ePDR−pPDR), indicating the amount of time the accusation lasts (lines 8-13). α is a tunable system parameter that
determines the severity of attack punishment.
• create, sign, and send to its downstream nodes a
R ECOVERY message, which contains the ACCUSATION message (lines 15-19). This message serves the role of canceling

On detecting a discrepancy between ePDR and pPDR:
1: Start timer(React Timer, β(1 − ePDR)
Executed at node on timeout of React Timer:
2: if (is receiver) then
3:
create salvage message ss // fallback
4:
Send message(ss, fastest upstream)
5: if (accusation list.contains accuser node(node id)) then
6:
return // each node can only accuse once
7: // create and flood accusation message
8: create accusation message acc
9: acc.accused = best upstream
10: acc.accuser = node id
11: acc.accusation time = α(ePDR − pPDR)
12: accusation list.add(acc)
13: Sign(acc); Broadcast(acc)
14: // send recovery message to the subtree
15: create recovery message rr
16: rr.accusation = acc
17: Sign(rr)
18: for each downstream node d do
19:
Send message(rr, d)
Executed at a node on receipt of an accusation message acc:
20: if (accusation list.contains accuser node(acc.accuser)) then
21:
return // only allow one accusation from a node at a time
22: Verify(acc.accuser, acc.sig)
23: accusation list.add(acc)
24: Broadcast(acc)
Executed at a node on receipt of a recovery message rr:
25: if (handled recovery messages.contains(rr)) then
26:
return // ignore duplicate recovery
27: if (accusation list.contains accuser node(rr.acc.accuser)
OR rr.acc.accusation time < α(ePDR − pPDR)) then
28:
return // ignore recovery mesage if the accuser has an unexpired
accusation or if the accused time is inconsistent
29: Verify(rr)
30: handled recovery messages.insert(rr)
31: if (React Timer is active) then
32:
cancel React Timer
33: for each downstream node d do
34:
Send message(rr, d)
35: if (is receiver) then
36:
create salvage message ss // fallback
37:
Send message(ss, fastest upstream)
Executed at a node on receipt of a salvage message ss:
38: Refresh timer(FG timer, FG TIMEOUT)
39: Send message(ss, fastest upstream)

Fig. 6: Attack reaction algorithm

the React Timer of nodes in N ’s subtree and activating
the fallback procedure at the receivers in N ’s subtree (see
Sec. IV-C4).
Upon receipt of an ACCUSATION message, a node checks
if it does not have an unexpired accusation from the same
accuser node and verifies the signature on the message. This
enforces our limited accusation mechanism, which allows
nodes to only have one active accusation at a time. If both
checks pass, the node adds a corresponding entry to its
ACCUSATION L IST (lines 20-23). Accusations are removed
from the ACCUSATION L IST after the accusation time has
elapsed.
Upon receipt of a R ECOVERY message rr from its
best upstream node, a F ORWARDING G ROUP node N checks
if it does not have an unexpired accusation from the same
accuser node and verifies the signature on the message. In
addition, the node also checks that the accusation time in the
message is at least as much as its own observed discrepancy
(the ePDR−pPDR value) (lines 27-28). This prevents attackers
who cause a large PDR drop from bypassing our defense by
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accusing its upstream node only for a short amount of time. If
all checks pass, it cancels its pending React Timer, forwards
rr to its downstream nodes (lines 31-34), and if it is a receiver,
activates the recovery procedure (lines 35-37) (see below).
4) Fallback Recovery: The accusation mechanism ensures
that when the metric is refreshed in the round after the attack
detection, the accused nodes are isolated. However, during
the round when an attack is detected, the receiver nodes in
the subtree of the attacker need to find alternative routes to
“salvage” data for the rest of the round. As shown in Sec. III-C,
a side effect of metric manipulation attacks is metric poisoning, which prevents recovery by relying on the metrics
in the current round. We address this inability by falling
back to the fastest route for routing during the remainder
of the round5 . Specifically, during the J OIN Q UERY flooding,
besides recording the best upstream node, each node also
records the upstream for the fastest route as fastest upstream
(Fig. 5, line 15). To recover from an attack, a receiver sends
a special J OIN R EPLY message (a salvage message) to its
fastest upstream node (Fig. 6, lines 2-4 and 35-37). Each
node on the fastest route forwards the special J OIN R EPLY
message to their fastest upstream node and becomes part of
the F ORWARDING G ROUP (Fig. 6, lines 38-39).
D. Impact of False Positives
Even though our defense scheme takes into account normal
network variations with the parameter δ, it is still possible
that some honest nodes are mistakenly accused. We argue
that such false positive accusations have little impact on the
performance of the system for two main reasons. First, under
most cases honest nodes cause only a small discrepancy on
the PDR, thus even if mistakenly accused, their accusation
duration is relatively short. Second, for most receivers there
are redundant paths to the source. Thus, even if some honest
nodes are wrongly accused, affected receiver nodes can obtain
a similar performance by using nearby alternate routes.
E. Practical Implementation Issues
1) Parameter Selection: S-ODMRP has three tunable parameters, the attack detection threshold δ, the coefficient for
accusation duration α, and the coefficient for React Timer β.
The selection of δ trades off tolerance to normal network
variations with sensitivity of the scheme to attacks. A larger
value for δ reduces false positives of accusing honest nodes,
however, it also allows attackers to inflict more impact without
being detected. An optimal value for δ is the estimated normal
network variation, i.e. the sum of the PDR discrepancy under
normal network conditions and the error in estimating ePDR
from the advertised metric. Our experiments show that a
typical value for δ is 20%.
The value for α trades off the effectiveness of the scheme
in isolating attacker nodes and the severity of isolating honest
5 The strategy is not attack-proof, as the fastest route may include malicious
nodes. However, since the route is only used for the remainder of the round,
we prefer to use an efficient procedure than to find attacker-free paths, which
is itself a challenging task and requires expensive protocols [24]. We further
discuss in Sec. V-B the impact of attacks against the recovery phase.

nodes due to false positives. In a stable network where the
number of false positives is small, or in a dense network where
the impact of false positives is small due to path redundancy,
it is advisable to have a large value for α in order to reduce the
impact of attacks. In Sec. V-A, we give lower bounds for α in
order for the scheme to bound the impact of attacks effectively.
The value for β trades off the attack reaction delay and the
effectiveness of the staggered reaction timeout technique for
preventing honest nodes from mistakenly accusing each other.
A smaller β results in quicker attack reaction, however, it also
results in a smaller difference in the reaction timeout value for
consecutive nodes on a path, increasing the chance of honest
nodes being mistakenly accused. In our experiments, we find
β = 20ms achieves a good balance between these two effects.
2) Ensuring Staggered Timeouts for Reaction Timers: To
avoid honest nodes mistakenly accusing each other, it is critical
that we ensure the React Timer at a downstream node does
not expire before the node receives a recovery message from
its upstream node. Denote the link latency as t, and the
estimated PDR of two consecutive nodes on a path as ePDR1
and ePDR2 . The React Timer timeout value for the two nodes
is T O1 = β(1 − ePDR1 ) and T O2 = β(1 − ePDR2 ). We need
to ensure T O2 − T O1 > t, that is,
β(1 − ePDR2 ) − β(1 − ePDR1 ) > t,
hence ePDR2 < ePDR1 − t/β. Therefore, to ensure staggered
reaction timeout, we require a node artificially decreases its
advertised metric if necessary so that its ePDR is at least t/β
smaller than the ePDR of its upstream node.
F. Generalization of S-ODMRP
Although we have described our defense scheme for high
throughput multicast protocols using the SPP metric, our
defense scheme can be generalized to other high throughput
metrics and other high performance multicast protocols.
1) Application to Other High Throughput Metrics:
S-ODMRP relies on the ability to derive an estimated PDR
(ePDR) from the metric. For the SPP metric, the derivation
is straightforward: The estimated PDR equals the SPP metric
value. What about other high throughput metrics?
We first observe that the goal of a high throughput multicast
protocol is to achieve a high PDR, hence a good metric should
reflect the PDR to some extent. For metrics that have a clear
connection with PDR, one approach is to define a mapping
function that translates metrics to PDR. For example, if the
ETX metric is used, one may define an estimation function Φ
that maps an ETX value to an estimated PDR, with Φ(1) =
1, Φ(1.5) = 0.6, etc. The mapping function does not have to
be accurate, since inaccuracies in the PDR estimation can be
masked as normal network variations, which is accounted for
in the protocol with parameter δ.
For metrics that do not easily admit such a mapping
function, an alternative approach is to append the PDR value
to the metric itself, so the metric is a tuple hmetric, P DRi.
The data delivery path is determined based on the value of
metric, whereas the P DR value determines the lower bound
of PDR a node is willing to accept and is used by our technique
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to prevent attacks. The data delivery path selection algorithm
should be enhanced to also consider the consistency between
P DR and metric in the received metric tuple, such that nodes
advertising low P DR but high metric are avoided.
2) Application to Other Multicast Protocols: Our defense strategy to rely on measurement-based detection and
accusation-based reaction generalizes to a class of high performance multicast protocols that exhibit the following characteristics:
• Path selection is based on the greedy approach of selecting
path with best metric (e.g., highest SPP, lowest latency).
• An estimation of the target performance metric (e.g., PDR,
latency) can be derived from the path metric.
• There exists an efficient metric refreshment protocol that
allows nodes to obtain correct metrics for attack recovery.
Such metric refreshment can be easily achieved by flooding
of a new metric establishment message.
As an example, consider a multicast protocol that aims to
achieve low latency communication. Then, a good path metric
is the latency of a node to the source, which can be derived and
propagated in the same fashion as the SPP metric. Each node
greedily selects the neighbor with the minimum latency metric
to be on the path. In such a protocol, an attacker can disrupt
the protocol by advertising a low latency metric to attract
many nodes, but intentionally delays packets. We can apply
our defense techniques in a straightforward way to address
these attacks: Each node monitors the discrepancy between
advertised and actual packet latency, and accuses and isolates
nodes with abnormally large discrepancies.
V. S-ODMRP S ECURITY A NALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the S-ODMRP
protocol and establish bounds on the attack impact and on
protocol resilience to various types of attacks.
A. Attack Impact
We upper bound the attack impact on the throughput of
S-ODMRP. We first give a precise definition of the attack
impact. We then present two theorems that upper bound the
attack impact and discuss their practical implications.
Let N denote the network of interest with k attacker nodes.
We define N 0 as the exact same network as N , except that
all the attacker nodes are removed. For a given non-attacker
0
receiver node R, let rR (t) and rR
(t) be the perceived PDR
of R at time t in network N and N 0 , respectively. We define
IR , the attack impact on a node R, as
Z t1
1
IR =
(r0 (t) − rR (t))dt,
t1 − t0 t0 R
where t0 and t1 are the start and end times for the interval of interest. Intuitively, the attack impact is the average
PDR degradation caused by the presence of attackers over
time compared to a network with no attackers. Alternatively,
the attack impact captures the discrepancy between a given
defense scheme and a hypothetical perfect defense scheme
where all the attackers nodes are perfectly isolated.

Recall that δ denotes the attack detection threshold and α
denotes the accusation duration coefficient. Also, recall that a
round is an interval between two consecutive mesh creation
events. We use λ to denote the time duration of a round. The
following two theorems bound the attack impact of metric
manipulation attacks on any non-attacker receiver node in the
presence of our defense mechanisms.
Theorem 1. In a network with k metric manipulation attackers, for any α ≥ kλ
δ 2 , the attack impact on any non-attacker
receiver node in S-ODMRP is upper bounded by δ during any
time interval of duration T  α.
Theorem 2. In a network with k metric manipulation attackers, if S-ODMRP uses a fallback procedure that restores the
PDR to the same level as in a benign network, then for any
α ≥ kλ
δ , the attack impact on any non-attacker receiver node
is upper bounded by δ during any time interval of duration
T  α.
Implications of Theorems 1 and 2. According to Theorems 1 and 2, for large enough α, the impact of metric manipulation attacks is bounded by the attack detection threshold
δ. For example, with δ = 20%, round duration of λ = 3
seconds, and a total of 10 attackers, according to Theorem 1,
we can set α ≥ 750 seconds to ensure the attack impact on any
non-attacker receiver node is bounded by δ. In practice, it is
rare that attacker nodes can coordinate perfectly to achieve the
maximum impact on all receiver nodes. Thus, even if we set
α smaller than the required minimum value, the attack impact
is likely to be bounded by δ for most receiver nodes.
Assuming the fallback procedure is able to restore the PDR
to a normal level, then Theorem 2 tells us that we only need to
set α ≥ 150 seconds. Our experiments reveal that, under most
cases, the fallback procedure is indeed able to restore the PDR
to a level close to the PDR in a benign network. Therefore,
it is sufficient to set α slightly larger than the value derived
from Theorem 2 (150 in the example above) to bound the
attack impact below the estimated normal network variations.
Theorems 1 and 2 also reveal that one of the most effective
attack strategies is to decrease the PDR by a fraction just
below δ. Using this strategy, the attack remains undetected
and achieves the upper bound for the attack impact. We note
that the impact caused by such attackers is unavoidable for
any observation-based detection scheme that also takes into
account normal network variations.
Proofs. To prove these two theorems, we first introduce
some additional notation and two lemmas. We label the start
of the time duration of interest of T as t0 . Without loss of
generality, let time ti and ti+1 be the start and end times of
round i, for i ≥ 0. Since a node only estimates its metric
at the beginning of a round, let mB (i) and m0B (i) be the
estimated PDR from metric for node B in round i in network
N and in N 0 , respectively. We use r̄B (i) and ∆B (i) to denote
the average perceived PDR and average PDR discrepancy of
node
R B in round i in network N , respectively, that is r̄B (i) =
1 ti+1
rB (t)dt and ∆B (i) = mB (i) − r̄B (i). Similarly, we
λ ti
0
define r̄B
(i) and ∆0B (i) for network N 0 . With a slight abuse
of notation, we denote the attack impact on node B in round
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i as IB (i), that is, IB (i) = IB (ti , ti+1 ). It is easy to see that
0
IB (i) = r̄B
(i) − r̄B (i).
For simplicity, we assume that the network is stable and
the PDR estimation from the metric is accurate. Hence, for
0
benign network N 0 , we have m0B (i) and r̄B
(i) are constant
0
0
and mB (i) = r̄B (i) for all i. Thus, without ambiguity, we use
0
r̄B
to denote both the estimated and perceived PDR at node
0
B in network N 0 . Thus, we have IB (i) = r̄B
− r̄B (i).
We also discount any physical layer effects (e.g., interfer0
ence), which means that mU (i) ≥ rU
for any node U , since
additional attacker nodes cannot decrease the metric derived
by honest nodes.
Lemma 1. For any round i and any non-attacker node B, we
have IB (i) ≤ ∆B (i).
Proof: In order for an attack to have any impact on R, it
0
must be the case that mB (i) ≥ rB
, since otherwise attacker
nodes will not be selected on the path. Therefore,
0
IB (i) = rB
− r̄B (i) ≤ mB (i) − r̄B (i) = ∆B (i).

Intuitively, Lemma 1 says that the attack impact of any node
is always upper bounded by its observed PDR discrepancy.
Lemma 2. For any consecutive sequence of time intervals
(t0 , t1 ), (t1 , t2 ), · · · , (tk−1 , tk ) and a non-attacker node B, if
IB (ti , ti+1 ) ≤ d for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, then IB (t0 , tk ) ≤ d.
Proof: This is immediate from the definition of attack
impact.
Proof of Theorem 1: For ease of exposition, we first analyze
the single attacker case, followed by the multiple attackers
case.
For the single attacker case, let A be the attacker node
in network N and let R be a non-attacker receiver node
that is downstream from A. Let node B be the immediate
downstream of node A on the path from A to R. Let pBR
denote the path PDR between B and R. Since there is no
attacker between B and R, we have rR = rB · pBR and
0
0
= rB
· pBR . Thus,
rR
Z t1
1
(r0 (t) − rR (t))dt
IR =
t1 − t0 t0 R
Z t1
1
=
(r0 (t) · pBR − rB (t) · pBR )dt
t1 − t0 t0 B
Z t1
pBR
=
(r0 (t) − rB (t))dt
t1 − t0 t0 B
= IB · pBR ≤ IB
Therefore, we only need to show IB ≤ δ.
We classify rounds into two categories, Category A for
rounds in which the attacker is not detected, and Category
B for rounds in which the attacker is detected or isolated.
An attack in a Category A round i implies, by definition,
that the attacker is not detected, i.e., it drops data below the
δ threshold: ∆B (i) < δ. By Lemma 1, we have IB (i) ≤
∆B (i) ≤ δ.
Let round a be the round in which the attack is detected
and let w be the discrepancy observed at node B when the

attack is detected. Then our protocol ensures that w ≥ δ and
that node B accuses and isolates node A for time αw ≥ αδ.
If we denote the time when the attacker recovers from the
accusation as tr , then tr − ta ≥ αw. Therefore, the attack
impact on node B from time ta to time tr is:
R ta+1 0
(rB − rB (t))dt
λ
λ
≤
≤
IB (ta , tr ) = ta
tr − ta
αw
αδ
Hence, if α ≥ δλ2 , we have IB (ta , tr ) ≤ δ. Therefore, by
Lemma 2, we have IB (t0 , tr ) ≤ δ. Since the maximum
accusation time is α, for any time interval with duration
T  α, we have IR ≤ IB ≤ δ.
For the case of multiple attackers, for rounds in Category A,
where no attackers are detected, we also have IB (i) ≤ δ. For
rounds in Category B, node B may switch to another attacker
node in the round after detecting an attacker node, hence for
a total of k attacker nodes, we have
IR (ta , tr ) ≤ IB (ta , tr ) ≤

kλ
kλ
≤
tr − ta
αδ

Hence, if α ≥ kλ
δ 2 , we have IR (ta , tr ) ≤ δ.
Proof of Theorem 2: In the proof of Theorem 1, we assume
a node has perfect path quality in the benign network, whereas
the node has zero PDR in the round when the attacker is
detected. If the fallback procedure can restore the PDR to the
level of the benign network, then the attack impact during that
round is bounded by δ (because, once the discrepancy on the
average PDR exceeds δ, the attack is detected and the node
invokes the fallback procedure). Therefore, we can derive an
upper bound for IR for rounds in Category B as follows:
IR (ta , tr ) ≤

kδλ
kδλ
kλ
≤
=
tr − ta
αδ
α

Hence, if α ≥ kλ
δ , then IR (ta , tr ) ≤ δ. Following a similar
analysis as in Theorem 1, we obtain that IR ≤ δ for any time
interval of duration T  α.
B. Attack Resiliency
We decompose our defense scheme into an attack detection
and an attack reaction component, and analyse the resilience
of the two components to various types of attacks. We show
that relying directly on the monitored throughput for attack
detection enables our defense to be oblivious to the underlying
attack mechanisms used by the attacker.
Claim 1. The attack detection mechanism in S-ODMRP
detects metric manipulation attacks that have an attack impact
greater than δ, regardless of the underlying attack mechanisms.
Proof sketch: Discounting physical layer impact, such as
jamming from attacker nodes, by Lemma 1 we see that the
attack impact on a node is bounded by its observed discrepancy between expected PDR and perceived PDR. Therefore,
by monitoring the discrepancy directly at each node, our
mechanism detects all attacks that cause throughput degradation larger than the threshold δ compared to the benign
network. The specific types of underlying mechanisms that
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enable the metric manipulation attack, such as wormholes or
flood rushing, do not affect the effectiveness of our detection
mechanism.
Claim 2. Assuming a stable network and no false accusation
attacks, at least one attacker is accused with each attack
reaction, regardless of the underlying attack mechanisms.
Proof sketch: In each attack reaction, there is at least
one node accusing another node. In the absence of false
accusation attacks, the accuser node must be a honest node.
Thus, we need to show that the accused node is an attacker
node. In a stable network, an attack reaction can only be
triggered by an active metric manipulation attacker. By our
staggered reaction timeout, the first downstream honest node
on the attacker controlled path will react first by accusing
its upstream attacker node. The recovery message from the
accuser node also cancels the reaction timer of its downstream
nodes, preventing honest nodes accusing other affected honest
nodes. Although an attacker node on the path can drop the
recovery message, such action will only cause the attacker
node itself to be accused by its downstream honest node, since
the reaction timer of the downstream node is not cancelled
without receiving a recovery message. Therefore, assuming no
false accusation attacks, at least one attacker node is accused
each time the attack reaction procedure is trigerred.
Claim 3. Assuming a stable network with k metric manipulation attackers and no Sybil attacks, S-ODMRP bounds the
attack impact, regardless of the underlying attack mechanisms.
Proof sketch: We consider separately the case of no false
accusation attacks and false accusation attacks.
By Claim 1, the detection scheme is oblivious to the
underlying attack types. By Claim 2, with no false accusation
attacks, at least one attacker node is accused per attack
reaction. With no Sybil attacks, after at most k attack reaction occurrences, all the attacker nodes will be identified
and isolated. Therefore, regardless of the underlying attack
mechanisms, choosing a large enough value for α will isolate
attackers for a large period of time, bounding the attack impact
as shown in Theorems 1 and 2.
We now consider the case when false accusation attacks
occur. Our limited accusation mechanism restricts attackers to
only have one active false accusation at any time. In addition,
our technique of activating the neighbor advertising the best
metric regardless of its accused status ensures that falsely
accused nodes are also used in routing. This prevents attacker
nodes from partitioning the network by strategically accusing
certain honest nodes. Therefore, false accusation attacks only
cause falsely accused nodes to be ignored in the metric
propagation process. However, in a dense enough network,
the impact on the metric derived at each node is limited, as
each node typically has multiple disjoint paths with similar
metric to the source. Therefore, the overall impact of the false
accusation attack is limited.
Finally, we consider attacks against the fallback procedure.
Since we do not protect the fallback recovery phase, attackers
that are selected as forwarders during the recovery phase
may drop packets without being punished. However, since

the fallback recovery is only used to salvage data for the
remaining of the current round, the impact of the attack is
limited. As shown in Theorem 1, even if the attacker is able
to completely block all packets to a node during the fallback
recovery procedure, the average attack impact is still bounded
by δ for sufficiently large values of α.
VI. E XPERIMENTAL E VALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate through experiments the vulnerability of metric enhanced multicast protocol by examining
the impact of different attacks, and investigate the effectiveness
of our defense mechanisms and its associated overhead.
A. Experimental Methodology
Simulation Setup. We implemented ODMRP-HT and
S-ODMRP using the ODMRP version available in the Glomosim [38] simulator. Nodes were set to use 802.11 radios
with 2 Mbps bandwidth and 250m nominal range. We simulate
environments representative of mesh networks deployments by
using the two-ray radio propagation model with the Rayleigh
loss model, which models environments with large reflectors,
e.g., trees and buildings, where the receiver is not in the lineof-sight of the sender.
The network consists of 100 nodes randomly placed in
a 1500m×1500m area. We randomly select 20 nodes as
multicast group members and among the 20 members one node
is randomly selected as the data source. Group members join
the group at the beginning of the experiment. At second 100,
the source starts to multicast data packets for 400 seconds at a
rate of 20 packets per second, each packet of 512 bytes. When
attackers are present, they are randomly selected among nodes
that are not group members. For S-ODMRP, we use RSA
signatures with 1024-bit keys, simulating delays to approximate the performance of a 1.3 GHz Intel Centrino processor.
We empirically tune the threshold δ = 20% to accommodate
random network variations in the simulated scenarios. The
timeout for React Timer is set as 20(1 − ePDR) millisecond,
and the accusation time is set as 250(ePDR − pPDR) second.
Nodes use the statistical-based method described in Sec. IV-C2
to determine their pPDR.
We used the SPP high-throughput metric, configured with
optimal parameters as recommended in [11]. Data points are
averaged over 10 different random environments and over all
group members.
Attack Scenarios. We consider the following scenarios:
• No-Attack : The attackers do not perform any action in the
network. This represents the ideal case where the attackers are
identified and completely isolated in the network, and serves
as the baseline for evaluating the impact of the attack and the
performance of our defense.
• Drop-Only: The attackers drop data packets, but participate in the protocol correctly otherwise. The attack has effect
only when attackers are selected in the F ORWARDING G ROUP.
We use this scenario to demonstrate that metric manipulation
amplifies data dropping attacks.
• LMM-Drop: The attackers combine local metric manipulation (LMM) with the data dropping attack. The attackers
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Fig. 7: The effectiveness of metric attacks on ODMRP-HT. For comparison we also depict attacks against ODMRP which does not use
high-throughput metrics.

conduct the LMM attack by re-advertising the same metric
they received in J OIN Q UERY, which is equivalent to making
their link metric of the previous hop equal to 1 (best).
• GMM-Drop: The attackers combine global metric manipulation (GMM) with the data dropping attack. The attackers
conduct the GMM attack by re-advertising a metric of 1 (best)
after receiving a J OIN Q UERY.
• False-Accusation: The attackers exploit our accusation
mechanism by falsely accusing random a honest node at
startup for the whole experiment period in order to reduce
the PDR. Due to space constraint, we do not present results
for attacks that aim to cause large bandwidth overhead through
frequent flooding of accusation messages using false accusations. We can upper bound the frequency of the accusation
message flooding from any attacker node to only once a few
seconds by imposing a lower bound on the accusation timeout,
thus the inflation of overhead is limited.
Metrics. We measure the performance of data delivery using
the packet delivery ratio (PDR), defined as PDR = nr /ns ,
where nr is the average number of packets received by all
receivers and ns is the number of packets sent by the source.
We also measure the strength of the attacks using as metric
the PDR Decrease Ratio (PDR-DR), defined as
PDRnoattack − PDRattack
PDR-DR =
,
PDRnoattack

where PDRattack and PDRnoattack represent the PDR when
the network is under attack and not under attack, respectively.
The overhead of our defense consists of three components,
the control bandwidth overhead due to additional messages
and larger message size (e.g., accusation messages, signatures on query messages), the computational overhead due
to cryptographic operations, and the additional data packet
transmissions caused by our protocol. We measure the control
bandwidth overhead per node, defined as the total control
overhead divided by the number of nodes. The computational
overhead is measured as the number of signatures performed
by each node per second. To measure redundant data packet
transmissions, we define data packet transmission efficiency as
the total number of data packets transmitted by all nodes in the
network divided by the total number of data packets received
by all receivers. Thus, data packet transmission efficiency
captures the cost (number of data packet transmissions) per
data packet received.

B. Effectiveness of Metric Manipulation Attacks
Fig. 7(a) shows the impact of Drop-Only attack on the
original ODMRP (not using high-throughput metric). The
protocol is quite resilient to attacks, i.e., PDR decreases by
only 15% for 20 attackers. This reflects the inherent resiliency
of mesh based multicast protocols against packet dropping, as
typically a node has multiple paths to receive the same packet.
Fig. 7(b) shows the PDR of the protocol when using
high-throughput metric (ODMRP-HT) under different types
of attacks. We observe that with the Drop-Only attack, the
PDR drops quickly to a level below the case when no high
throughput metric is used. Thus, simple packet dropping
completely nullifies the benefits of high throughput metrics.
By manipulating the metrics as in LMM-Drop and GMMDrop, the attacker can inflict a much larger decrease in PDR.
For example, the PDR decreases from 72% to only 25% for 10
attackers using GMM-Drop, in contrast to 55% for Drop-Only.
Fig.7(c) compares the impact of the attack in terms of the PDR
Decrease Ratio. We see that metric manipulation significantly
increases the attack strength. For example, with 10 attackers,
the PDR-DR of GMM-Drop (68%) is more than double the
PDR-DR of Drop-Only (32%). Thus, we conclude that metric
manipulation attacks pose a severe threat to high-throughput
protocols.
C. Effectiveness of the Defense
In Fig. 8 we show the effectiveness of our defense
(S-ODMRP) against different types of attacks, compared to
the insecure ODMRP-HT protocol. S-ODMRP suffers only a
small PDR decrease relative to the baseline No-Attack case.
For example, a total of 20 attackers causes a PDR drop of
only 12%, considerably smaller than the case without defense,
which shows a PDR decrease by as much as 55% in the
GMM-Drop attack. To rule out random factors, we performed
a paired t-test [37] on the results showing that S-ODMRP
improves the PDR for all attack types, with P-value less than
2.2×10−16 . For 10 attackers, S-ODMRP improves the PDR of
ODMRP-HT for Drop-Only, LMM-Drop and GMM-Drop by
at least 4.5%, 16.7%, 33%, with 95% confidence level. Thus,
our defense is very effective against all the attacks. The small
PDR decrease for S-ODMRP can be attributed to two main
factors. First, common to all reactive schemes, attackers can
cause some initial damage, before action is taken against them.
Second, as the number of attackers increases, some receivers
become completely isolated and are not able to receive data.
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Fig. 8 also shows an interesting phenomenon: The PDR
decrease for S-ODMRP is similar for all attacks, despite the
varying strength of the attacks. This outcome reflects the
design of our defense mechanism in which accusations last
proportional to the discrepancy between ePDR and pPDR:
Attacks that cause a small discrepancy (e.g., Drop-Only) are
forgiven sooner and can be executed again, while attacks that
cause a large discrepancy (e.g., GMM-Drop) result in a more
severe punishment and can be executed less frequently.
Finally, we note that the attack impact with S-ODMRP is
less than δ = 20%, which is consistent with the bound in our
analysis in Sec. V-A.
D. Defense Resiliency to Attacks
Attackers may attempt to exploit the accusation mechanism
in S-ODMRP. Fig. 9 shows that S-ODMRP is very resilient
against the False-Accusation attack, in which attackers falsely
accuse one of their neighbors. This comes from the controlled
nature of accusations, which only allows an attacker to accuse
one honest node at a time. Also, as described in Sec. IV-B,
falsely accused nodes that advertise a good metric may continue to forward data.
E. Overhead of S-ODMRP
Fig. 10(a) and 10(b) show the control bandwidth and
computational overhead for S-ODMRP. We observe that for
all attack configurations, the bandwidth and computational
overhead are maintained at a stable low level of around 0.95
kbps and 0.9 signatures per node per second. To understand
the source of the overhead better, we analyzed different
components of the overhead. The result shows that the overhead due to reacting to attackers (such as dissemination of
ACCUSATION and R ECOVERY messages) is negligible, since
the attackers, once detected, are accused for a relatively long
period of time The bulk of the overhead comes from the
periodic network-wide flooding of authenticated J OIN Q UERY
packets. Since query flooding is common in all scenarios,

we obtain a similar level of overhead across different scenarios. The reason for the slight overhead decrease for an
increasing number of attackers for the False-Accusation attack
is that J OIN Q UERY from the falsely accused honest nodes
are ignored by their neighbors, resulting a smaller number of
transmissions of J OIN Q UERY packets.
In Fig. 10(c), we notice that S-ODMRP under various
attacks even improves slightly the data transmission efficiency
of ODMRP-HT with no attacks. This apparent anomaly can be
explained because in S-ODMRP nodes that are further away
from the source are more likely to be affected by attacks and
these are the nodes that require more transmissions to receive
data packets.
VII. R ELATED W ORK
Work studying multicast routing specific security problems
in wireless networks is scarce with the notable exception of
the authentication framework by Roy et al. [25] and BSMR
[26] which focus on outsider and insider attacks for the wellknown tree-based MAODV multicast protocol.
Significant work focused on the security of unicast wireless
routing protocols. Several secure routing protocols resilient to
outside attacks were proposed in the last few years such as
Ariadne [19], SEAD [18], ARAN [20], and the work in [17].
Wireless specific attacks such as flood rushing and wormhole were identified and studied. RAP [31] prevents the
rushing attack by waiting for several flood requests and
then randomly selecting one to forward, rather than always
forwarding only the first one. Techniques to defend against
wormhole attacks include Packet Leashes [32] which restricts
the maximum transmission distance by using time or location
information, Truelink [33] which uses MAC level acknowledgments to infer if a link exists or not between two nodes,
and the work in [34], which relies on directional antennas.
The problem of insider threats in unicast was studied in
[19], [21]–[24]. Watchdog [21] detects adversarial nodes by
having each node monitors if its neighbors forward packets to
other destinations. SDT [22] and Ariadne [19] use multi-path
routing to prevent a malicious node from selectively dropping data. ODSBR [23], [24] provides resilience to colluding
Byzantine attacks by detecting malicious links based on an
acknowledgment-based feedback technique.
VIII. C ONCLUSION
We considered the security implication of using high
throughput metrics in multicast protocols in wireless mesh networks. In particular, we identified metric manipulation attacks
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that can inflict significant damage on the network. The attacks
not only have a direct impact on the multicast service, but also
raise additional challenges in defending against them due to
their metric poisoning effect. We overcome the challenges with
our novel defense scheme that combines measurement-based
attack detection and accusation-based reaction. Our defense
also copes with transient network variations and malicious
attempts to attack the network indirectly by exploiting the
defense itself. We demonstrate through experiments that our
defense is effective against the identified attacks, resilient to
malicious exploitations, and imposes a small overhead.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Dimitris Koutsonikolas
and Sabyasachi Roy for providing an implementation of the
SPP metric for ODMRP. This work is supported by National
Science Foundation CAREER Award No. 0545949. The views
expressed in this research are not endorsed by the National
Science Foundation.
R EFERENCES
[1] J. Dong, R. Curtmola, and C. Nita-Rotaru, “On the pitfalls of using highthroughput multicast metrics in adversarial wireless mesh networks,” in
Proc. of IEEE SECON ’08, 2008.
[2] Y. B. Ko and N. H. Vaidya, “Flooding-based geocasting protocols for
mobile ad hoc networks,” Mob. Netw. Appl., vol. 7, no. 6, 2002.
[3] R. Chandra, V. Ramasubramanian, and K. Birman, “Anonymous gossip:
Improving multicast reliability in mobile ad-hoc networks,” in Proc. of
ICDCS, 2001.
[4] Y.-B. Ko and N. H. Vaidya, “GeoTORA: a protocol for geocasting in
mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proc. of ICNP. IEEE, 2000, p. 240.
[5] E. L. Madruga and J. J. Garcia-Luna-Aceves, “Scalable multicasting:
the core-assisted mesh protocol,” Mob. Netw. Appl., vol. 6, no. 2, 2001.
[6] S. J. Lee, W. Su, and M. Gerla, “On-demand multicast routing protocol
in multihop wireless mobile networks,” Mob. Netw. Appl., 2002.
[7] E. M. Royer and C. E. Perkins, “Multicast ad-hoc on-demand distance
vector (MAODV) routing,” in Internet Draft, July 2000.
[8] J. G. Jetcheva and D. B. Johnson, “Adaptive demand-driven multicast
routing in multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks.” in Proc. of MobiHoc,
2001, pp. 33–44.
[9] H. Lundgren, E. Nordstrom, and C. Tschudin, “Coping with communication gray zones in IEEE 802.11b based ad hoc networks,” in Proc. of
WOWMOM ’02. ACM Press, 2002, pp. 49–55.
[10] D. S. J. D. Couto, D. Aguayo, J. C. Bicket, and R. Morris, “A highthroughput path metric for multi-hop wireless routing,” in Proc. of
MOBICOM ’03. ACM, 2003, pp. 134–146.
[11] S. Roy, D. Koutsonikolas, S. Das, and C. Hu, “High-throughput multicast
routing metrics in wireless mesh networks,” in Proc. of ICDCS ’06,
2006.
[12] A. Chen, D. Lee, G. Chandrasekaran, and P. Sinha, “HIMAC: High
throughput MAC layer multicasting in wireless networks,” in Proc. of
Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems (MASS ’06), October 2006.
[13] B. Awerbuch, D. Holmer, and H. Rubens, “The medium time metric:
High throughput route selection in multirate ad hoc wireless networks,”
MONET, Spec. Iss. on Internet Wireless Access: 802.11 and Beyond,
2005.
[14] A. Adya, P. Bahl, J. Padhye, A. Wolman, and L. Zhou, “A multi-radio
unification protocol for ieee 802.11 wireless networks,” in Proc. of
BroadNets ’04, 2004.
[15] S. Keshav, “A control-theoretic approach to flow control,” Proc. of the
Conference on Communications Architecture and Protocols, 1993.
[16] R. Draves, J. Padhye, and B. Zill, “Routing in multi-radio, multi-hop
wireless mesh networks,” in Proc. of MOBICOM ’04. ACM, 2004.
[17] P. Papadimitratos and Z. Haas, “Secure routing for mobile ad hoc
networks,” in Proc. of CNDS, January 2002, pp. 27–31.

[18] Y.-C. Hu, D. B. Johnson, and A. Perrig, “SEAD: Secure efficient distance
vector routing for mobile wireless ad hoc networks,” in Proc. of WMCSA,
June 2002.
[19] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, “Ariadne: A secure on-demand
routing protocol for ad hoc networks,” in Proc. of MOBICOM, 2002.
[20] K. Sanzgiri, B. Dahill, B. N. Levine, C. Shields, and E. Belding-Royer,
“A secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks,” in Proc. of ICNP, 2002.
[21] S. Marti, T. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, “Mitigating routing misbehavior
in mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proc. of MOBICOM, August 2000.
[22] P. Papadimitratos and Z. Haas, “Secure data transmission in mobile ad
hoc networks,” in Proc. of WiSe, 2003, pp. 41–50.
[23] B. Awerbuch, D. Holmer, C. Nita-Rotaru, and H. Rubens, “An ondemand secure routing protocol resilient to byzantine failures,” in Proc.
of WiSe’02. ACM Press, 2002.
[24] B. Awerbuch, R. Curtmola, D. Holmer, C. Nita-Rotaru, and H. Rubens,
“On the survivability of routing protocols in ad hoc wireless networks,”
in Proc. of SecureComm’05. IEEE, 2005.
[25] S. Roy, V. G. Addada, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, “Securing MAODV:
Attacks and countermeasures,” in Proc. of SECON ’05. IEEE, 2005.
[26] R. Curtmola and C. Nita-Rotaru, “BSMR: Byzantine-resilient secure
multicast routing in multi-hop wireless networks,” in Proc. of IEEE
SECON ’07, June 2007.
[27] R. Draves, J. Padhye, and B. Zill, “Comparison of routing metrics for
static multi-hop wireless networks,” in Proc. of SIGCOMM ’04, 2004.
[28] S. Roy, D. Koutsonikolas, S. Das, and C. Hu, “High-throughput multicast
routing metrics in wireless mesh networks,” Elsevier Ad Hoc Networks,
2007.
[29] J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song, and A. Perrig, “The Sybil attack in sensor
networks: analysis & defenses,” in Proc. of IPSN ’04. New York, NY,
USA: ACM Press, 2004, pp. 259–268.
[30] C. Piro, C. Shields, and B. N. Levine, “Detecting the Sybil attack in
mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proc. SecureComm, 2006.
[31] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, “Rushing attacks and defense
in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols,” in Proc. of WiSe, 2003.
[32] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, “Packet leashes: A defense
against wormhole attacks in wireless ad hoc networks,” in Proc. of
INFOCOM, 2003.
[33] J. Eriksson, S. V. Krishnamurthy, and M. Faloutsos, “Truelink: A
practical countermeasure to the wormhole attack in wireless networks,”
in Proc. of ICNP ’06, 2006.
[34] L. Hu and D. Evans, “Using directional antennas to prevent wormhole
attacks,” in Proc. of NDSS, 2004.
[35] A. Perrig, R. Canetti, D. Song, and D. Tygar, “Efficient and secure
source authentication for multicast,” in Proc. of NDSS, February 2001.
[36] M. Poturalski, P. Papadimitratos, and J.-P. Hubaux, “Secure neighbor
discovery in wireless networks: formal investigation of possibility,” in
ASIACCS ’08.
[37] D. S. Moore and G. P. McCabe, Introduction to the Practice of Statistics.
New York: W.H.Freeman, 2003.
[38] “Global mobile information systems simulation library - glomosim.”
[Online]. Available: http://pcl.cs.ucla.edu/projects/glomosim/

